Leibniz And Spinoza As Applied To Baseball

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Leibniz And Spinoza As Applied To Baseball

Essay 2

First we will consider the assigned baseball scenario under Leibnizs system of metaphysics.  In the baseball scenario, the aggregate of the player, bat, pitch, swing and all the other substances in the universe are one and all contingent.  There are other possible things, to be sure; but there are also other possible universes that could have existed but did not.  The totality of contingent things, the bat, the player, etc., themselves do not explain themselves.  Here Leibniz involves the principle of reason; there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise.  There must be, Leibniz insists, something outside the totality of contingent things (baseball games) which explains them, something which is itself necessary and therefore requires no explanation other than itself.  
This forms Leibnizs proof for the existence of God; a version of Aquinass cosmological arguments.  God, then, is the necessary being which constitutes the explanation of contingent being, why the universe is this way rather than any other.  Not only is God the explanation of the baseball scenario but he is also the source of the intelligibility of such concepts as bat, swing and pitch.  Leibniz goes further to prove the omniscience of God.  If God is the explanation of the intelligibility of the universe, then God must have access to that intelligibility, such that God could be said to know what it is that being allowed to exist---that is, God must have the ability to grasp complete concepts.  Not only does God constitute the contingent baseball game but he also knows what will take place before it happens.  The pitch, swing and hit all take place not because God creates them but because he allows them.  There is only one constraint on what God allows to happen, it must not violate Leibnizs other basic principle---non-contradiction.  God could not allow it to happen that the batter hit the ball and the pitcher got a strike.  God chooses the universe that is most perfect, therefore the hitter hitting the ball out of he park was the most perfect of all possibilities.
Leibniz uses the word Monad to mean that which is one, has no parts and is therefore indivisible.  These are the fundamental existing things.  A monad contains within itself all the predicates that are true of the subject of which it is the concept, and these predicates are related by sufficient reason into a vast single network of explanation.  So the monad must not only exhibit properties, but contain within itself virtually or potentially all the properties it will exhibit in the future, and also contain the trace of all properties it did exhibit in the past.  Take for example the ball in the baseball game scenario.  The ball monad contains all the properties of the ball, roundness, hardness, whiteness, etc.  It also contains a trace of the balls past, pop-ups, inside a glove and ground balls.  In addition to this it contains the potential to be hit out, have the leather knocked off or be thrown away.  All these properties are folded- up within the Monad and they unfold when they have sufficient reason to do so (at the most perfect moment).
Not only does the Monad contain all of its own properties but it also contains all of it relational properties to all the other Monads in the universe.  Each and every Monad is self-sufficient.  They do not need to be related to other Monads and neither are they influenced by other Monads.  All of what appears to be cause and effect is a mere illusion.  The relation of cause and effect is, according to Leibniz, merely a cognitive tool that human beings use to understand Monads and their relational properties.  In the baseball scenario it appears that the hitter causes the ball to leave the park but in actuality he did not cause it per se.  What really causes the ball to leave the park is the pre-established harmony On Leibnizs view, every Monad is like a clock, behaving spontaneously in the way that it does, independently of other Monads, but nevertheless